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DEFAMATION LAW-The Private Figure Plaintiff Must Establish a
New Element to Make a Prima Facie Showing: Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps

I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps' imposes a new element of proof on private figure plaintiffs2 in
media defamation actions.' In Hepps, the Supreme Court held that where
a newspaper publishes speech about matters of public interest, the plaintiff
now bears the burden of showing that the defamatory statements4 are
false. 5 This decision abrogates the common law rule that the defendant
bears the burden of proving the truth of the defamatory statements.'
This Note first discusses the historical background of distinctions enunciated by the Court in making decisions in defamation cases: the status
of the plaintiff, the contents of the defamatory speech, and the status of
the defendant. The Note then reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning
in Hepps for placing the burden of proof as to falsity on the plaintiff.
Finally, this Note considers the implications of Hepps on defamation
doctrines in the United States generally, and New Mexico specifically.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. ,' owned a local Philadelphia
newspaper, the Philadelphia Inquirer (Inquirer). 8 The Inquirer published
a series of five articles purporting to link Maurice Hepps, the principle
I. 106 S.Ct. 1558 (1986).
2. Private figure plaintiffs are not public officials, public figures or political candidates. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra note 14 for further discussion on private figure
plaintiffs.
3. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1559.
4. A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of a person in the estimation
of the community or deters third persons from dealing or associating with the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559, Comment e (1977).
New Mexico case law defines a defamatory statement as one which tends to render the person
about whom it is published contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, exposes him to public
hatred or contempt, or causes virtuous men not to associate with him. Bookout v. Griffin, 97 N.M.
336, 339, 639 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1982) (citations omitted).
5. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1559.
6. Id.at 1560. See also infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
7. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560.
8. Id.
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stockholder in a Pennsylvania corporation, 9 to certain named "underworld" figures and to organized crime generally."0 As a result of the
articles, Hepps" sued the newspaper owner 2 for defamation in Pennsylvania district court. 3
In considering the defamation suit, the state court looked to two separate, but related, factors: fault and falsity. " Pennsylvania law required
a private figure plaintiff,' 5 such as Hepps, suing for defamation to bear
the burden of establishing the defendant's negligence 6 in its primafacie
case. '"Additionally, Pennsylvania followed the common law presumption
that a defamatory statement was false.'" If the plaintiff met his burden
by establishing negligence, the defendant then had the burden of proving
the truth of the defamatory communication. '"If successful, the defendant
had an absolute defense to the action.2 °
9. Hepps was the principle stockholder of General Programming, Inc., (GPI), a Pennsylvania
corporation which franchised a chain of stores selling beer, soft drinks, and snacks. Hepps v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304_, 485 A.2d 374, 377 (1984), rev'd 106 S.Ct. 1558
(1986). GPI owned and licensed the trademarks "Thrifty Beverage" and "Brewer's Outlet," and
provided management and consulting services to its franchisees. Id.
10. The articles discussed a state legislator, described as "a convicted felon" whose actions
displayed "a clear pattern of interference in state government by [the legislator] on behalf of Hepps
and Thrifty." Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560 (citations omitted). The stories reported that federal "investigators have found connections between Thrifty and underworld figures" and that "the Thrifty
Beverage beer chain . ..had connections . . . with organized crime." Id.
11. Hepps sued individually, while the remaining 19 plaintiffs were GPI and some of its franchisees.
Hepps, 485 A.2d at 377. See also supra note 9.
12. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., was sued as publisher of the Inquirer. Hepps, 485 A.2d at
377. Hepps also sued the reporters who wrote the articles, William Ecenbarger and William Lambert.
Id.
13. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560.
14. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
15. Id. There is no indication in this decision that there was any dispute over the fact that Hepps
was a private figure. Hepps was not a public official and did not meet the standards for a public
figure as described in Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 351. A general purpose public figure is one who achieves
such fame or notoriety in the community that he becomes a public figure for all purposes. Id. A
limited public figure is one who voluntarily participates or is drawn into public controversies and
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. Id. A public figure invites public attention
and comment and usually has access to the media to rebut defamatory statements. Hepps, 485 A.2d
374, 382 n.5.
For a more complete discussion of the standards for determining a public official or public figure
in New Mexico, see Higdon, Defamation in New Mexico, 14 N.M.L. REV. 321, 331-32 (1984).
16. In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court left it to the states to determine
what standard of fault to apply in a private defamation action. The only limitation was that states
could not create a scheme that imposed liability without fault. Id. at 347. Pennsylvania adopted an
ordinary negligence standard. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343 (a)(7) (1978).
17.
In all civil actions for libel, no damages shall be recovered unless it is established
to the satisfaction of the jury, under the direction of the court as in other cases,
that the publication has been maliciously or negligently made, but where malice
or negligence appears such damages may be awarded as the jury shall deem
proper.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8344 (1982).
18. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
19. "Burden of defendant.-In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving,
when the issue is properly raised:
(1)The truth of the defamatory communication ..
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343 (b)(I) (1982). See also infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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The parties in Hepps raised the issue of whether placing the burden of
proof as to falsity on the defendant was an unconstitutional restraint on
speech before trial, but the trial court reserved its ruling on the issue."
After all the evidence had been presented, the trial court concluded that
the Pennsylvania statute, which imposed on the defendant the burden of
proving the truth of the statements, was unconstitutional. 22 The trial judge
regarded placing the burden on the defendant to prove the truth of the
statements a violation of the first amendment, in that it inhibited free
expression of speech. 23 The court, therefore, instructed the jury that it
was the plaintiff's onus to prove falsity.24 Following this charge, the jury
found for the defendants. 5
On appeal,26 the Pennnsylvania Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling.27 The court held that imposing the proof of falsity burden on the
defendant did not inhibit free speech or violate the first amendment, 2"
and remanded the case for a new trial.29 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
the Inquirer's petition for writ of certiorari," and subsequently reversed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.3"
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. HistoricalBackground
Analysis of defamatory statements is traditionally divided into two
issues: 1) whether the person making the statement did so with the requisite degree of fault; and 2) whether the statement is in fact false.3 2 At
common law, the individual's interest in maintaining a good reputation
was considered so significant that defamation was a strict liability tort
without consideration of fault.33 Additionally, common law presumed any
21. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560.
22. Id.
23. Hepps, 485 A.2d at 382.
24. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1560.
25. Id. at 1561.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722(7) (1982). This statute allowed Hepps to take a direct appeal from
the trial court to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The statute reads:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders
of the courts of common pleas in the following classes of cases...
(7) Matters where the court of common pleas has held repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or to the Constitution of this
Commonwealth, any treaty or law of the United States or any provision of the
Constitution of, or of any statute of, this Commonwealth, or any provision of
any home rule charter ....
27. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1561.
28. Hepps, 485 A.2d at 387.
29. Id. at 389.
30. 105 S.Ct. 3496 (1985).
3 I. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its findings. Hepps, 106
S.Ct. at 1565.
32. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116 (5th ed. 1984).
33. For a more complete discussion of the development of the common law scheme of defamation,
see generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1352-57 (1975), and Keeton, Defamation and
Freedom of the Press, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1221 (1976).
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defamatory statement to be false.34 Thus, if the matter sued on was
defamatory, the plaintiff had only to put the statement into evidence and
prove the defendant was responsible for uttering or publishing it to others."
If the plaintiff proved this prima facie case, the defendant could avoid
liability entirely by proving the statement was true.36 These principles
were the mainstay of defamation law until 1964, when the United States
Supreme Court began grappling with the conflict between the state interest
in protecting the reputation of private individuals and the free speech
interest protected by the first amendment. 37
Prior to Hepps,38 the Supreme Court has focused on three categories
when considering defamation cases-all of which involve the issue of
fault. This section traces the development of these categories. Part One
discusses the significance of the status of the plaintiff: public official,
public figure, or private figure. Part Two focuses on the analysis of the
actual content of the speech: a matter of public interest or private concern.
Finally, Part Three discusses the significance of the status of the defendant:
media or nonmedia.
1. The Status of the Plaintiff: Public Official, Public Figure, or
Private Figure
In N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,39 the Supreme Court first acknowledged that
the common law treatment of a defamatory statement as a strict liability
tort was, in certain circumstances, an abridgment of the first amendment
right of free expression. 4' The first category of "circumstances" examined
by the Court was statements made about public officials." The Court held
that a public official could not recover damages for defamatory statements
relating to his official conduct absent a showing that the statement was
made with actual malice, that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth.42 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found that the
34. Eaton, supra note 32, at 1353.
35. Id.
36. See C. GATLEY ON LiBEL AND SLANDER § 351 (7th ed. R. McEven and P. Lewis 1974) (truth
is an absolute defense).
Truthfulness was also a defense to an action for defamation in New Mexico. Franklin v. Blank,
86 N.M. 585, 588, 525 P.2d. 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1974). Truth was considered an affirmative defense,
however, which was waived if not raised at the first opportunity in defendant's responsive pleading.
Eslinger v. Henderson, 80 N.M. 479, 481, 457 P.2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1969).
37. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. 106 S.Ct. at 1558.
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). N.Y Times was the seminal defamation case. Sullivan, City Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, claimed to have been defamed by two errors in a paid advertisement
in the N.Y. Times charging the civil rights of Negroes had been violated during 1960 racial disturbances
in the South. Id. at 256. The jury found the publisher failed to prove the text of the ad was true
and awarded Sullivan $50,000. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court unanimously reversed the trial
decision, but was in turn reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 263-65.
40. Id. at 279-80.
41. Id. at 256.
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first amendment required that debate on public issues should be uninhibited and robust, and that such debate could well include vehement and
sharp attacks on public officials. 3 Subsequently, the Court extended the
fault requirement of actual malice to include defamatory statements made
about public figures.'
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether some showing of fault
was necessary when the statements concerned private figures.45 In Gertz
v. Welch,' the Court held that a private figure plaintiff 7 must establish
some degree of fault to prove a primafacie case," but left the states free
to decide just how much fault was required.49 The only limitation made
on the states was that some standard of fault had to be imposed.5 ° Today,
standards of the various states range anywhere from ordinary negligence
to actual malice. 5'
42. Id. at 279-80.
43. Id. at 270.
44. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), decided with Associated Press v. Walker.
The Saturday Evening Post accused Wally Butts, the coach of the University of Georgia football
team, of fixing a football game with Paul "Bear" Bryant, coach at the University of Alabama. Id.
at 135. The jury found the article defamatory and awarded damages to Butts. Id. at 138. The district
court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Id. at 138-39. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 161-62.
While seven justices agreed that defamatory statements made about public figures should be
protected, the justices could not agree on the exact standards to be used in public figure cases. Id.
at 153-55, 162-65, 170-74. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, resorted
to a balancing test which focused on the status of the plaintiff, the character of the speech, and the
conduct of the publisher. Id. at 153-55. This constituted a somewhat lesser hurdle for public figure
plaintiffs. Id. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Brennan and White, insisted the constitutional
privilege of N.Y. Times should apply equally to defamation of public figures. Id. at 162-65 (Warren,
concurring). Justices Black and Douglas reiterated their position that public speech about public
issues should be absolutely immune from libel action, but acquiesced in the Chief Justice's position
to dispense of the issue. Id. at 170-74 (Black, concurring & dissenting).
45. See infra note 46.
46. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). A John Birch magazine published an article reporting on the murder
trial of a police officer, claiming it was part of a nationwide communist conspiracy to discredit law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 325-26. The plaintiff, the attorney handling a civil claim for damages
on behalf of the victim of the police officer's assault, was awarded $50,000 by the jury. Id. at 325,
329. The District Court entered judgment n.o.v. for the defendant, concluding the first amendment
protected discussion of any public issue. Id. at 329. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Id. at 330. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. at 352.
47. See supra note 14.
48. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47.
49. Id. at 347-48. See also supra note 15.
50. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. See also supra note 15.
51. Some states established negligence as the necessary degree of fault to be shown when private
figure plaintiffs sue media defendants. I.e. Utah, Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah
1981), Illinois, Troman v. Wood, 62 lll.2d. 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975), and Kansas, Gobin v. Globe
Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975). Other states require private figure plaintiffs to
show gross irresponsibility on the part of media defendants. I.e. New York, Ortiz v. Valdescastilla,
102 A.D.2d. 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1984). Still other states require private figure plaintiffs suing
media defendants to prove actual malice. I.e. Michigan, Clark v. American Broadcasting Cos., 684
F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), and Texas, Golden Bear Distributing
Systems, Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Thus, the common law treatment of defamation as a strict liability tort
was modified to require some degree of fault.52 For public figures/officials,
the plaintiff must show actual malice;53 for private figure plaintiffs, the
degree of fault imposed is determined by the individual state,54 but must
be more than strict liability. 5
2. The Content of the Defamatory Speech: A Matter of Public
Interest or Private Concern
The second "circumstance" considered by the Court was the content
of the speech as a factor for determining the fault standard. The courts
began distinguishing the existence of a defamatory action based upon the
content of the speech, holding that in matters involving a private individual and subjects of public interest, the plaintiff must meet the actual
malice standard to make a primafacie case.56 The courts became heavily
involved in deciding what statements constituted matters of public interest
52. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47.
53. Public officials can recover both compensatory and punitive damages only upon clear and
convincing proof of actual malice. Id. at 342-43, 348-50. Clear and convincing proof is more than
preponderance of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979). See also infra note 54 for a further discussion of compensatory and punitive
damages.
54. The private figure plaintiff can recover compensatory damages only by showing some degree
of fault by the defendant, with the states determining the degree of fault necessary. Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 346-47. New Mexico adopted ordinary negligence as the degree of fault necessary to establish
liability for private figures defamed by media defendants. Marchiando v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649
P.2d 462 (1982). For further discussion, see Note, Libel Law-New Mexico Adopts an Ordinary
Negligence Standard for Defamation of a Private Figure, 13 N.M.L. REv. 715 (1983).
Compensatory damages in a defamation action may be either general or special damages. See
Keeton, supra note 31, at 842. General damages refer to normal and usual losses sustained which
can be anticipated when someone's reputation is damaged. Id. at 843. Special damages are damages
that do not so frequently result from defamatory statements to be recoverable as general damages
and may be proven to enhance general damages. Id. at 844. Special damages, in some cases, may
include pecuniary losses. Id.
Gertz also held that private figure plaintiffs must show actual malice, however, to recover punitive
damages. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50. This holding was modified in 1985 when the Supreme Court
ruled that actual malice was not necessary to recover punitive damages when a private figure plaintiff
sued on defamatory statements which involved only a matter of private concern. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 751 (1985).
Punitive damages are those given to the plaintiff over and above compensation for the injuries.
See Keeton, supra note 31, at 9. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant and
deter others from following the defendant's example. Id.
55. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. See also supra note 15.
56. Rosenbloom v. Metro Media, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). A distributor of nudist magazines in the
Philadelphia area sued a local radio station over broadcasts referring to the distributor's arrest for
possession of obscene literature. Id. at 33-34. One broadcast described the distributor's motion for
injunctive relief as an action by "smut distributors" and "girlie book peddlers" to force the state to
"lay off the smut literature racket." Id. at 34-35. The jury found for Rosenbloom. Id. at 40. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court decision on the grounds that Gertz applied even though the
plaintiff was not a public figure, and thus there was insufficient evidence to show the required
standard of negligence. Id.
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and generally concluded that all human events which were newsworthy
could be clasified as matters of public concern. 57 In 1974, though, the
Supreme Court abandoned reviewing the content of the statements as a
method of determining what speech was protected and instead focused
again on the status of the plaintiff.58
3. The Status of the Defendant: Media or Nonmedia
A third "circumstance" arguably considered by the Court in determining the necessary degree of fault is the status of the defendant. Although
there has not been a U.S. Supreme Court decision directly on point,59 a
question arises on the application of the first amendment protections to
media and nonmedia defendants. The majority of the Court's decisions
have dealt only with media defendants.' The decisions, however, do
suggest that the constitutional protections of defamation encompass freedom of speech, as well as freedom of the press, and therefore, imply that
the decisions are not limited to media defendants. 6' Lower courts generally
have concluded the constitutional privilege to defame public officials and
public figures extends to media and nonmedia defendants alike.62
In summary, prior to the N.Y Times decision in 1964,63 a statement, if
found defamatory ' was actionable without regard to the fault of the
57. The courts found that false credit reports were the only clear area that was not a matter of
public interest. See Eaton, supra note 32, at 1402.
58. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality
would abridge this legitimate state interest [in enforcing a remedy for defamation
of private individuals] to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion
the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc
basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which
do not--to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, 'what information is relevant to self-government.' We doubt the wisdom of committing
this task to the conscience of judges . . . . The 'public or general interest' test
for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private
defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake ....
59. See infra note 60.
60. All of the major U.S. Supreme Court defamation decisions prior to Dun & Bradstreet dealt
with a media defendant. See Eaton, supra note 32, at 1404 n.228. In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court
dealt with a credit report issued by a credit reporting agency, which was deemed a nonmedia
defendant. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751-53. The Court, however, did not base its decision
on the fact that the case involved a nonmedia defendant. Instead, the Court focused on the fact that
the speech involved a matter of purely private concern. Id. at 761-63.
61. The Court in N.Y. Times did not limit application of its privilege to media defendants, but
stated that the rule protected "critics of public concern." N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256, 264, 268,
273, 279, 283, 292. The majority opinion implied constitutional protection extended to nonmedia
speakers as well as the press. Id. at 265-66. See also Eaton, supra note 32, at 1403-08.
62. Eaton, supra note 32, at 1416. See also Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 99 N.M. Ii, 20, 653 P.2d 511,
520 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982).
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64. See supra note 4.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

6
defendant.6 5 In a line of cases since N.Y. Times, ' however, the Supreme
67
Court has substantially modified the requirement of fault. Today, public
figures and officials must show the defendant acted with actual malicewith knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth-in order to
69
make a prima facie case. 68 Private figure plaintiffs, on the other hand,
7
must show the degree of fault required by the particular state. " The level
of fault may range anywhere from negligence to actual malice, but may
not be strict liability. 7 Additionally, at one point a distinction was made
on the basis of speech content.7 2 Although technically abandoned, there
73
is evidence of this distinction becoming pertinent again. Finally, most
defamation cases that have come before the Court have involved media
defendants. 7 4 Although still subject to debate, the Court has implied that
the degree of fault imposed is determined on the basis of the plaintiff's,
not the defendant's, status. 75

B. The Court's Reasoning in Hepps
In Hepps,76 the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the second
of the defamation issues: falsity.77 At common law, once the plaintiff had
made a showing of a defamatory statement made by the defendant, a
prima facie case had been established-without regard to whether the
statement was in fact true.78 The burden then shifted to the defendant to
79
establish, as an affirmative defense, that the statement was true. In
° however, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
Hepps,
the placement of this burden for the first time."
In considering this issue, the Court acknowledged there will be instances when the judge and jury are unable to resolve conclusively whether
the statement is true or false.8 2 In these cases, the burden of proof is
dispositive.83 If the plaintiff bears the burden of showing falsity, there
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. 254.
See supra notes 43, 45-48, and accompanying text.
See supra note 52.
See supra note 14.
See supra note 53.
See supra notes 15, 49, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
106 S.Ct. 1558.
Id. at 1563.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
106 S.Ct. 1558.
Id.
Id. at 1563.
Id.
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will be some cases in which the plaintiff cannot meet the burden despite
the fact that the speech is actually false. In these cases, the plaintiff will
lose. Similarly, if the defendant bears the burden of showing truth, there
will be times a defendant cannot meet the burden despite the fact that
this speech is actually true. In which case, the defendant will lose.' Thus,
under either rule, there will be times when the result in these cases is
different than what the result would be if all speech were demonstrably
true or false.8 5
When faced with such a dilemma, the majority opinion86 tips the scales
in favor of protecting true speech." To ensure that true speech on matters
of public interest is not deterred, Hepps overrides the common law presumption that defamatory speech is false, in cases involving a private
figure plaintiff, a media defendant, and speech of public interest.88 After
Hepps,s9 then, the private figure plaintiff suing a media defendant on
matters of public interest must now show in the primafacie case that the
statements are false," along with the requisite degree of fault, to recover
damages."'

Underlying the Court's decision is the concern that placing the burden
of proving truth upon media defendants deters speech on matters of public
interest because of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result.92 Because
this chilling effect is antithetical to the first amendment's protection of
free speech on matters of public interest, the private figure plaintiff is
now required to bear the burden of showing the falsity of defamatory
statements.
Additionally, the Court recognizes this decision will protect some speech
84. Id. at 1563-64.
85. Id. at 1564.
86. Id. at 1559. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
87. Id. at 1564. The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rehnquist, argues, however, that the majority opinion grossly undervalues the
strong state interest in protecting private reputations. Id. at 1569 (Stevens, dissenting). Stevens
argues the concern for protection of truthful statements must make room for a different emphasis
when the defamatory statement involves the reputation of a private individual. Id. at 1570. The
dissent reasons a private individual is more vulnerable to injury and more deserving of recovery.
Id. In libel suits brought by private individuals, the strong state interest in compensating injuries to
private reputations requires that defendants should bear the burden of proof of falsity. Id. at 1566,
1569-71.
88. Id. at 1564.
89. Id. at 1558.
90. The Court does not consider, however, the quantity of proof of falsity that the plaintiff must
present to recover damages. Id. at 1565 n.4.
91. Id. at 1559.
92. Id. at 1564. The dissent reasons, though, that the majority has relied on the previously
discredited analysis of the content of the speech by protecting the speech simply because it addresses
matters of public interest. Id. at 1571 (Stevens, dissenting). The dissent would not extend the
constitutional protection of defamation to every item of public interest because that would unacceptably abridge the legitimate state interest in protecting private reputations. Id.
93. Id. at 1564.
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which is false, but unprovably false." Earlier Court decisions, however,
have affirmed that the first amendment requires the protection of some
false speech to promote speech on matters of public interest.95
Furthermore, the Court notes, this decision adds only marginally to
the burden a plaintiff already bears in defamation cases." The plaintiff
must already show a degree of fault, 97 for which the states have set
standards ranging from negligence to actual malice. 9" As a practical matter, evidence offered by a plaintiff to show actual malice-knowledge of
the falsity of a statement or reckless disregard for its truth-will often
include evidence of the falsity of the defamatory statements.' When
showing negligence, a plaintiff will generally discuss fault to show the
too
defendant knew or should have known the statement was false.
The Hepps Court, addressing the issue of falsity for the first time,
recognized that, in cases where the statement is unable to be shown
0
conclusively as true or false, the burden of proof is dispositive. ' In order
to ensure that true speech on matters of public interest is protected, the
Court abrogates the common law presumption that defamatory speech is
false in cases involving a private figure plaintiff, a media defendant, and
speech of public interest. 02 The Court recognizes the decision may protect
speech which is false, but unprovably so; but affirms that sometimes the
first amendment requires protection of some false speech to promote
speech on matters of public concern.' 3 After Hepps, " then, the private
figure plaintiff suing a media defendant on matters of public interest must
now show that the statements 05are false, along with the requisite degree
of fault, to recover damages. 1
C. Implications of the Hepps Decision
1. The Impact of Hepps on a National Level
Public Interest. The Hepps Court bases its opinion on the fact that this
speech involved a matter of public interest and thus, was more deserving
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1564-65. The Court cites Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("the First Amendment requires that
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters") and N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at
372 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)), ("to provide 'breathing space' for true
speech on matters of public concern, the Court has been willing to insulate even demonstrably false
speech from liability .... ").
96. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565.
97. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
98. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
99. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
104. 106 S.Ct. 1558.
105. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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of protection than speech of purely private concern. " As noted previously, however, Supreme Court decisions long ago seemed to abandon
the "matter of public interest" distinction.' 07 The Court in Hepps'°8 clearly
looks to the content of the speech as one of its tests, "9and seems to be
returning to a form of "matter of public interest" standard. "0
If the Court is returning to the previously discussed "public interest""'
distinction, it could prove very difficult for the Court. As acknowledged
in the earlier decisions facing this issue, the problems are enormous in
determining what are matters of public concern." 2 Morever, in again
returning to this standard, the Hepps Court offers no guidance in the
opinion about what constitutes matters of public interest. "'
Defendant Status. The Hepps decision is narrow and applies only to
media defendants."' The Hepps Court does not address what standards
would apply if a private figure plaintiff sued a nonmedia defendant. '"
Arguably, the same policy considerations protecting the speech of media
defendants, such as the encouragement of debate on important matters,
should protect the speech of nonmedia defendants. 6 If the Court believes
the first amendment protects and encourages open debate on matters of
public concern, it should not matter in what forum the debate occurs;
whether in a local newspaper article or in a speech on the street comer.
The failure of Hepps to address the nonmedia defendant issue may
reflect disagreement in the Court as to this issue. Justice O'Connor,
mindful of the Court's limitations, also simply may be indicating to the
readers that the extent of the holding is limited to media defendants."'
106. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
108. The Court also focused on the content of the speech in the earlier case of Dun & Bradstreet,
where the Court modified its ruling that a showing of actual malice was necessary to recover punitive
damages. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763. See supra note 53.
109. Justice O'Connor, in the majority opinion, says one of the forces to be considered is whether
the speech at question is of "public concern." Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1563.
110. Id. at 1563-64. See also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
11. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of the difficulties courts had in determining what was speech of public
concern under the Rosenbloom standard, see Eaton, supra note 32, at 1402.
113. The Court never discusses why the matters discussed in the Inquirer articles are matters of
public concern, but simply states that this is so. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1563.
114. Id. at 1565 n.4.
115. Id. Justice O'Connor specifically declines to "consider what standards would apply if the
plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant.
... (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 1564. The concurring opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice
Blackmun, also adheres to the principle that the rule announced in Hepps should apply to both media
and nonmedia defendants. id. at 1565-66.
In addition, in Dun & Bradstreet, five members of the Court (White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), agreed the rights of media defendants are no greater and no less than those
enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities. Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 773, 783-84.
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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While arguments will continue to be made that the Hepps ruling should
apply to both media and nonmedia defendants, this issue is clearly unresolved by the Court at this time.
2. Substantive and Procedural Implications of Hepps in New
Mexico
The New Mexico Court of Appeals declared the standards enunciated
in New Mexico relating to defamation actions apply to suits involving
8
both media and nonmedia defendants." The New Mexico Court of Appeals reached this conclusion even though no U.S. Supreme Court decision has directly ruled on this issue. "' The Hepps decision, refusing to
extend its ruling to nonmedia defendants, raises further questions as to
the validity of the New Mexico Court of Appeals conclusion. This will
no doubt continue to be the state of the law in New Mexico, until the
New Mexico Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court acts
further on this question. What is clear, however, is that when a private
figure plaintiff sues on a matter of public interest, truth is no longer an
affirmative defense; rather, falsity is an element of the plaintiff's casein-chief. 2 ° Accordingly, the New Mexico law stating truth is available
2
as a defense to a defamation action ' is no longer valid. In addition,
because the private figure plaintiff suing on matters of public interest now
bears the burden of proof as to falsity of the statements, the plaintiff must
also plead falsity in his complaint.' 22
The Hepps Court notes its decision adds only marginally to the burden
the plaintiff must already bear.'23 Whether this is actually true remains
to be seen. The Court reasons that evidence offered by the plaintiff as to
the publisher's fault will generally also encompass evidence of the falsity
of the statements.' 24 As the dissent points out, however, a plaintiff can
demonstrate negligence, such as in the manner in which the material was
25
gathered, without showing either truth or falsity.' In these instances,
the plaintiff will have an additional burden of proving falsity.
118. Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 99 N.M. 11,20, 653 P.2d 511, 520 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 99 N.M.
47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982).
119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. However, truthfulness will still be an affirmative
defense when private figure plaintiffs sue on matters of purely private concern. Hepps, 106 S.Ct.
at 1559. See also N.M. Unif. Jury Instructions-Civil 13.1006 (1986).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9 (1978). The statute will still be valid, though, when a private
figure plaintiff sues on a matter of private concern; in these cases, Hepps does not apply and
truthfulness is still an affirmative defense for the defendant. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1559. See also
N.M. Unif. Jury Instructions--Civil 13.1013 (1986).
122. J. COUND, J. FRIENDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 419 (3d.

ed. 1980).
123. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
125. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1568 n.5.
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Moreover, the Hepps majority gives no guidance as to the quantity of
proof of falsity a private figure plaintiff must present to recover damages. 26
' Arguably, the plaintiff could deny the truth of the articles and
this issue would go to the jury."27 If the plaintiff did no more than this,
it is unclear if the jury would consider that the plaintiff had established
the burden of proof as to falsity. If the standard for this burden is a
preponderance of the evidence, 12 a private figure plaintiff may indeed
carry a heavier burden because of the Hepps decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Common law presumed that defamatory statements were false. 129
Therefore, a plaintiff did not have to prove that statements were false to
recover in a defamation action.'3° Rather, the defendant could show the
statement was true, which constituted an absolute defense. 3 ' The decision
in Hepps is important because it abrogates this common law principle. 31 2
In so doing, the Court reasoned that the first amendment requires free
and open debate on matters of public concern and that putting the burden
of falsity on the defendant discourages such debate, contrary to the first
amendment. "' Accordingly, the Hepps Court shifted this burden of falsity
to the plaintiff. "3
It is clear that, at least in cases where a private figure plaintiff sues a
media defendant on statements made about matters of public concern,
the plaintiff is now required to show the falsity of the statement in the
primafaciecase. 35
' Yet the Hepps case still leaves unanswered questions.
What will be the actual increased burden plaintiffs will bear due to this
decision?'36 What will be the quantity of proof that juries will require
plaintiffs to present?' 37 Will the ruling in Hepps apply to nonmedia defendants as well?' 38 If the Court in fact is returning to a public interest
126. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127. A summary judgment motion is granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). The standard for granting a summary judgment
motion mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Id. In defamation cases, then, presumably the
fact that a plaintiff denied that the defamatory statement was true would be enough evidence to
create a genuine issue as to the falsity of the statement. Id. This issue would then be one on which
a directed verdict would not be granted and it would go to the jury. Id.
128. See Higdin, supra note 14, at 334.
129. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 90.
136. See supra notes 95-99, 119-22, and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 89.
138. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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distinction, what factors are courts to consider in analyzing the content
of speech?' 39 The answers to these questions will be addressed in future
defamation actions in courtrooms across this country.
DEBRA A. HILL

139. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.

